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PARTICULARITY DISCOVERY IN QUI TAM ACTIONS:
A MIDDLE GROUND APPROACH TO PLEADING
FRAUD IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR

BRIANNA BLOODGOOD†
Health care fraud in the United States is policed in a unique enforcement
landscape. The False Claims Act, one major piece of that landscape, grants private
citizen whistleblowers the ability to sue on behalf of the government to remedy fraud.
Plaintiffs in these qui tam actions are subject to procedural requirements characteristic
of any federal civil fraud lawsuit, including the rigid pleading standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to resolve
a circuit split as to the precise particularity of the claim required under the rule; some
circuits require a representative sample of false claims for a complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss, while others relax the requirement and hold that general allegations
supporting a strong inference of fraud will suffice. Ample literature exists in support
of the latter, more lenient approach to evaluating a complaint, but little, if any,
explores the possibility that a resolution outside the existing dichotomy could optimize
results in the health care fraud qui tam context.
This Comment explores one such solution: pre-merits “particularity discovery”
designed to allow a qui tam plaintiff to plead a representative sample of false claims
in her complaint. By exploring the merits and shortfalls of the particularity
requirement as it applies to False Claims Act qui tam plaintiffs, this Comment first
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suggests that health care fraud cases may warrant special considerations at the pleadings
stage. Then, this Comment uses examples of pre-merits discovery in other contexts,
namely class certification and jurisdictional disputes, to illustrate relevant, albeit
imperfect, blueprints for a particularity discovery procedure. Finally, this Comment
proposes a framework for ruling on a qui tam plaintiff ’s motion for particularity
discovery that could operate within the district court’s existing discretion. Because of
the importance of remedying health care fraud, this middle ground could provide
opportunities for plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims to court without sacrificing the
benefits and purpose of the particularity requirement. This Comment will hopefully
encourage courts to consider adopting the more rigid representative sample standard
for particularity pleading, recognizing that the addition of targeted particularity
discovery to the procedure creates a viable middle ground between the two existing
approaches to pleading.
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INTRODUCTION
Policing fraud in the health care industry should be a goal that unites the
government and individual citizens. When individuals and organizations
engage in fraudulent practices, consumers, patients, and the government bear
the financial cost,1 and the integrity of clinical decisionmaking and patient
wellness2 may be threatened. New technologies and the massive increase in
the volume of data in the health care industry make for an increasingly
complex enforcement landscape.3 The False Claims Act (FCA) provides one
important vehicle for the government and private citizens to combat fraud.
Despite the desirability of detecting and remedying fraud, private
citizens, called “relators,” who sue under the FCA’s qui tam provision without
the help of the government, must overcome a number of rigid procedural
hurdles. Not only must a relator satisfactorily plead with plausibility under
Rule 8’s jurisprudential standard,4 but she must also state her allegations with
sufficient specificity, or “particularity,” as required by Rule 9(b).5 Currently,
there is a circuit split regarding the proper stringency a court should use in
assessing the sufficiency of a plaintiff ’s FCA complaint under Rule 9(b). One
approach requires that a plaintiff plead a representative sample of fraudulent
claims, including identifying at least one claim by time, place, and persons
involved. The other allows a plaintiff to satisfy her pleading burden with more
general allegations that support a strong inference of fraudulent activity. The
Supreme Court has declined to resolve the existing split multiple times, but
an increasing number of courts favor the more relaxed “strong inference”
standard. In this Comment, I challenge the potential for either standard to
produce the optimal result in health care fraud cases.

1 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: The Health Care Fraud and Abuse
Control Program Protects Consumers and Taxpayers by Combating Health Care Fraud (Feb. 26,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-health-care-fraud-and-abuse-control-program-protects
-conusmers-and-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/BD9V-56M5] (detailing the Justice Department’s successes
at recovering government payments of American tax dollars that were incurred by fraudulent practices).
2 See Medicare Fraud & Abuse: Prevention, Detection, and Reporting, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. 3 (Oct. 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-LearningNetwork-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Fraud_and_Abuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPA2-N6PP]
(stating that abuse of federal health care programs puts “beneficiaries’ health and welfare at risk”).
3 See Basel Kayyali, David Knott & Steve Van Kuiken, The Big-Data Revolution in US Health
Care: Accelerating Value and Innovation, MCKINSEY & CO. (Apr. 2013), http://www.mckinsey.
com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/the-big-data-revolution-in-us-healthcare [https://perma.cc/Q9T6-JWPA] (describing a dramatic increase in data in the health care field).
4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (providing that a pleading must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (clarifying that a claim for relief must be “plausible on its face”).
5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
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While a qui tam relator may possess credible information of a fraudulent
scheme, that information alone may not be sufficient to satisfy a strict
pleading requirement. Discovery may provide an important cure. Regardless,
the allure of assisting relators must be balanced against the principal purposes
of Rule 9(b): providing notice to defendants and preventing frivolous suits.
Here, I argue that the solution is a combination of the representative sample
standard with limited particularity discovery6—discovery designed to help a
relator state her claim with particularity. This framework is an optimal middle
ground between the existing alternatives. It provides the procedural value of
the representative sample approach—namely, that a pleading with mere
general allegations will not survive dismissal—with an adequate opportunity
for some relators to satisfy it.
In Part I, I provide background information on the FCA, qui tam
procedure, and the Rule 9(b) inquiry. In Part II, I explore the circuit split on the
particularity requirement as it relates to notice, frivolous suits, informational
disparities, and the policy goals of the FCA. Finally, in Part III, I outline the
procedure a court may use during the pleadings stage of an FCA suit,
including a proposed standard by which the court may decide on a relator’s
motion for particularity discovery.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The False Claims Act
The False Claims Act7 is the primary tool that the government uses to
protect taxpayers from fraud. Known to some as the “Informer’s Law,” it was
enacted during the Civil War to combat widespread fraud by government
contractors.8 Such contractors often supplied the Union Army with faulty
weapons, spoiled food, and sickly mules.9 This behavior, President Abraham
Lincoln and Congress decided, was sufficiently unpatriotic to warrant both
civil and criminal penalties.10
Under the FCA, any person who knowingly presents, makes, or uses a
materially false or fraudulent claim, or who delivers or certifies a materially
6 As discussed below, some literature refers to pre-merits discovery designed to allow a plaintiff
to survive a motion to dismiss as “plausibility discovery.” Because this Comment focuses on pre-merits
discovery to allow a plaintiff to satisfy a more stringent standard under Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement, I use the phrase “particularity discovery.”
7 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–32 (2012).
8 United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976).
9 David L. Haron, Mercedes Varasteh Dordeski & Larry D. Lahman, Bad Mules: A Primer on
the Federal and Michigan False Claims Acts, 88 MICH. B.J., Nov. 2009, at 22, 22.
10 See id. (quoting President Lincoln saying, “Worse than traitors in arms are the men who
pretend loyalty to the flag, [and] feast and fatten on the misfortunes of the nation . . . .”).
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false record or statement to the federal government, can be held liable in a
civil action.11 The statute’s legislative history and the sentiment surrounding
its passage support the notion that the law was intended to apply broadly.12
By providing a mechanism to hold defendants accountable for money
wrongfully taken from the government, the FCA helps return billions of
dollars each year to programs funded by taxpayer dollars.13 Health care fraud
cases form a significant portion of the FCA enforcement landscape. Indeed,
over half of the $3.5 billion recovered under the FCA in 2015 was derived from
health care fraud claims.14
B. Mechanics of a False Claims Act Qui Tam Suit
In setting and executing investigative priorities, the Attorney General
decides whether to bring a civil action against a person for a False Claims Act
violation.15 However, the FCA also grants standing to private citizens to sue
on behalf of themselves and the United States government.16 Qui tam actions
are colloquially referred to as “whistleblower” suits because the relator17 is
often a current or former employee or affiliate of a defendant organization.
When such a relator brings an FCA suit, she is effectively “blowing the
whistle” on the defendant’s illegal behavior.

11 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). Such behavior may also give rise to criminal charges, but that
is beyond the scope of this Comment. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012) (providing that making a “false,
fictitious, or fraudulent” claim to the government may result in imprisonment of up to five years).
12 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 956 (1863) (statement of Sen. Davis) (arguing that
because there are no individuals “who deserve more certain and speedy punishment than . . . [those]
who have failed to perform their duties in the execution of contracts made with the Government,”
the proposed jurisdiction of the FCA should be expanded from military courts to include civil
courts); Alan Levins & Alison Cubre, Pleading a Claim Under the False Claims Act, ABA (May 23,
2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialpractice/articles/spring2014-0414-pleading
-claim-under-false-claims-act.html [https://perma.cc/29SA-6DP3] (noting that subsequent amendments
to the FCA have expanded its scope).
13 See Justice Department Recovers over $3.5 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015 [https://perma.cc/DL5B-LJEV] (quantifying taxpayer
recoveries from FCA claims in one recent year).
14 See id. (noting that of the $3.5 billion recovered from FCA cases in 2015, “$1.9 billion came
from companies and individuals in the health care industry”).
15 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2012).
16 Id. § 3730(b). The term “qui tam” comes from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.”
Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
17 A “relator” is an informer who furnishes information to the government. Relator, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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FCA qui tam complaints are filed in camera18 and remain under seal for
at least sixty days.19 While the complaint is under seal, the government has
an opportunity to review it and to determine the extent of its involvement in
the case. It may decide to prosecute the case, move to dismiss, settle the case,
or decline to intervene altogether.20 The qui tam plaintiff ’s potential recovery
will depend on this decision.21 Eventually, if the court does not dismiss and
the parties do not settle, the court lifts the seal and the case proceeds as an
ordinary civil case under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
Comment will focus principally on cases in which the Department of Justice
declines to intervene.
Once the court lifts the seal, the complaint is served on the defendant, who
may then move to dismiss in accordance with ordinary federal civil practice.22
To survive the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff’s complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief ”23 that is “plausible on its face.”24 Claims of fraud require a more nuanced
level of pleading. Under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff alleging fraud must “state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”25 The purpose of this
particularity requirement is to place the defendant on notice of the allegations
and to protect the defendant against conclusory and unfounded claims of
fraud.26 There is no dispute that Rule 9(b) applies to qui tam relators.27
Notably, the circuits are divided as to what constitutes a sufficiently
particular complaint in the FCA context. One approach requires that the
plaintiff ’s complaint identify at least one false claim by time, place, content
18 “In camera” means in private chambers, or in a courtroom without public access. In Camera,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
19 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). On motion, the government can ask the court to delay the unsealing
for good cause. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
20 See id. § 3730(c) (listing these options).
21 Subject to certain conditions that are beyond the scope of this Comment, relators are
entitled to receive fifteen to twenty-five percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the
claim. Id. § 3730(d).
22 See id. § 3731 (outlining special procedures in false claims actions but indicating no unique
dismissal features); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a defendant may assert by motion the
defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
24 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Twombly plausibility standard was
further clarified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), in which the Supreme Court
instructed courts not to grant conclusory allegations the assumption of truth.
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
26 See United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“The particularity rule serves an important purpose in fraud actions by alerting defendants to the
precise misconduct with which they are charged and protecting defendants against spurious charges
of immoral and fraudulent behavior.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ziemba v.
Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001))).
27 2 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 5.04[A][2], at 5-48
(3d ed. 2010).
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of the action, and names of actors.28 Defendants favor this “representative
sample” approach because it places the onus on the private citizen relator to
present specific factual details of the alleged fraudulent activity. This is often
a heavy burden for a relator who, absent ordinary civil discovery, lacks the
investigative resources of the government.
Under this standard, private plaintiffs may face difficulties pleading a
representative sample of facts in a way that ensures the claim is not
conclusory—in other words, that it does not require the court to make any
logical leaps from the facts to find that the claim for fraud is plausible.29 For
example, in United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals, the
complaint alleged that ninety-eight non-reimbursable prescriptions for sixty
milligrams of a drug called Kapidex (samples of which Takeda provided to
doctors) were submitted to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
for reimbursement.30 The sixty milligram dose for Kapidex is not eligible for
federal reimbursement for certain uses that are off-label.31 The relator, a sales
manager for Takeda, also alleged two additional facts: the names of sixteen
doctors who wrote prescriptions for Kapidex (at unknown dosages) and
submitted them for reimbursement, and the fact that ninety-three percent of
all prescriptions for Kapidex are for a sixty milligram dose.32 Nonetheless, the
court dismissed the claim on Takeda’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Allowing the case
to proceed would have required the court to speculate that the specific
Kapidex prescriptions of the sixteen identified doctors were in fact for sixty
milligrams; such a logical leap indicated a lack of plausibility.33 The Takeda
case illustrates that even a relator with specific information suggesting a
strong possibility of fraud will struggle under the strict representative sample
pleading standard given the interrelationship among Rule 8(a), Rule 9(b),
and the Twombly–Iqbal plausibility standard.
The government’s amicus curiae brief34 in Takeda asserted that a “strong
inference” approach to pleading an FCA violation is preferable to a heightened

28 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455-56
(4th Cir. 2013) (outlining this requirement).
29 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda
Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (No. 12-1349) [hereinafter Brief for United States—Takeda]
(articulating the complicated and varied approaches used to assess the interrelationship between the
particularity of the pleaded facts and the plausibility of the claim).
30 Takeda, 707 F.3d at 459.
31 See id. at 454 (explaining that the FDA had approved a sixty milligram dose of Kapidex only
for the treatment of erosive esophagitis, making the prescription of a sixty milligram dose for the
treatment of other conditions off-label).
32 Id. at 459.
33 Id.
34 The United States declined to intervene in the relator’s suit against Takeda, and thus
submitted an amicus curiae brief. Government’s Notice of Election to Decline Intervention, United
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requirement,35 and, in 2014, the Third Circuit joined several other circuits in
adopting that more relaxed pleading standard.36 In courts that have adopted
this approach, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss by pleading facts
that support a strong inference that the defendant violated the FCA.37 A
general description of the alleged fraudulent scheme combined with such
reliable indicia of fraudulent activity will suffice.38
In United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management, the United
States decided not to intervene in the relator’s lawsuit.39 The complaint
alleged that defendant Renal, a dialysis care services company, had falsely
certified to the government that it was in compliance with certain quality of
care regulations and had submitted false claims regarding the use of and
reimbursement for the drug Zemplar.40 Specifically, Foglia alleged that Renal’s
inventory logs indicated that the company used a maximum of thirty-four vials
of Zemplar per day, but that its patient logs indicated that fifty vials would have
been necessary if such vials were only used once.41 The court reasoned that
financial motivation existed for Renal to charge the government as if it were
“using vials of Zemplar in the single use fashion while actually harvesting and
using ‘extra’ Zemplar from the vials.”42 While this was not the only possible
explanation of the facts, the court reversed the dismissal of the case, noting
that the hypothesis presented in the complaint was sufficient to give Renal
notice, especially since only Renal had evidence in its possession to prove or
disprove the claim.43
The Takeda and Foglia cases illustrate different treatment of Rule 9(b)’s
particularity standard and different views of how health care fraud allegations
fit within FCA motion to dismiss framework. While the Supreme Court has
yet to grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split,44 circuits now tend to apply
States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., No. 1:09-cv-01086-AJT-JFA (E.D. Va. Dec. 13,
2010), ECF No. 36.
35 See Brief for United States—Takeda, supra note 29, at 11-12 (discussing the circuit courts that
do not require a plaintiff to plead the details of a specific false claim).
36 See United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing approvingly the approach of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits).
37 See id. at 156-57 (citing similar holdings in First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit decisions).
38 See id. at 157-58 (noting that to satisfy the standards of Rule 9(b), the plaintiff must provide
“particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong
inference that claims were actually submitted” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009))).
39 Id. at 155.
40 Id. at 158.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See George B. Breen et al., Supreme Court Declines to Opine on Circuit Split over Rule 9(b)
Pleading Requirements for FCA Claims, HEALTH CARE & LIFE SCI. CLIENT ALERT (Epstein Becker
& Green, P.C., New York, N.Y.), June 2014, at 1, http://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2014/09/
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a more relaxed understanding of the particularity requirement.45 This
Comment will focus on the reasons why, when combined with the use of
particularity discovery, adhering to a strict reading of Rule 9(b) provides the
proper balance between defendant protection and government enforcement.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING APPROACHES
Both courts and scholars have identified strengths and weaknesses of the
representative sample and strong inference approaches. A survey of the
existing law and literature is appropriate to understand the distinctive
procedural and substantive elements of health care fraud cases that warrant
special consideration and frame the existing debate.
Advocates of the strict representative sample approach articulate a
number of rationales: to give sufficient notice to the defendant of the
allegations; to prevent frivolous lawsuits; to eliminate fraud actions in which
all facts are learned in discovery; to protect the defendant from reputational
harm; and to prevent plaintiffs from imposing costs on the court, the
defendant, and the government without a factual basis.46 Critics of the
representative sample approach focus on the difficulty of surviving a motion
to dismiss under that standard. As the Foglia court described, the representative
sample approach appears to be “one small step shy of requiring production of
actual documentation with the complaint.”47 The strong inference standard’s
lenient pleading approach accommodates a relator’s informational disparity
against the typical corporate defendant, arguably better supporting the goals
of the FCA.
The concerns raised by scholars on both sides explain why Rule 9(b)
requires some form of a heightened pleading standard. I focus on three
considerations that inform the particularity discovery proposal in the health
care fraud context: achieving the proper degree of notice to the defendant;
balancing the need to prevent frivolous suits with plaintiffs’ access to the
HCLS-Client-Alert_Supreme-Court-Declines-to-Opine-on-Circuit-Split-Over-Rule9b.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FR5D-Q9TS] (reporting that the Supreme Court declined to review the decision in Takeda
in early 2014). Last summer, the Court denied certiorari on another case on this subject. See AT&T,
Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016).
45 See Michael Lockman, Comment, In Defense of a Strict Pleading Standard for False Claims Act
Whistleblowers, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1559, 1559-60 (2015) (“A strict interpretation of Rule 9(b)—requiring
a relator’s complaint to identify representative samples of the allegedly false claims—is falling out of
fashion across the circuits.”); Sara A. Smoter, Note, Relaxing Rule 9(b): Why False Claims Act Relators
Should Be Held to a Flexible Pleading Standard, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 242-44 (2015) (noting that
a minority of circuits continue to rigidly apply Rule 9(b)). That the Supreme Court has again declined
certiorari on the issue suggests that the trend toward relaxation will continue.
46 2 BOESE, supra note 27, § 5.04.
47 754 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th
Cir. 2009)).
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courts; and addressing the informational disparity. I conclude with reference
to the goals of health care fraud enforcement and the potential impact of the
particularity requirement in realizing those goals.
A. Notice to Defendant
A fundamental principle of procedural law is that a defendant must be
given sufficient notice to defend the charges against him.48 In FCA cases,
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement “demands a higher degree of notice than
that required for other [non-fraud] claims”49 for a number of reasons. The
Rule is designed to “enable the defendant to respond specifically and quickly to
the potentially damaging allegations.”50
Specificity in a health care fraud complaint is indispensable. In health care
fraud cases, the financial stake for any given defendant is extraordinarily high:
the statutory penalty for FCA violations ranges from $5,500 to $10,000 per
claim (as adjusted by law for inflation), plus treble damages.51 Moreover, a
typical health care fraud case rarely involves a single false claim; rather,
common fraudulent conduct involves recordkeeping practices like up-coding,
bundling payments, inflating cost reports, or false certification that services
were completed in the manner making them eligible for reimbursement.52
Such practices can involve dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of individually
recoverable claims, each of which carries its own statutory penalty. FCA
lawsuits indeed recover billions of dollars per year.53 The specificity demanded
by Rule 9(b) is clearly necessary for proper notice.
Rule 9(b)’s requirement also demands that a defendant be allowed to
respond expediently to allegations of fraud. When the government disburses
payments for health care claims that turn out to be fraudulent, taxpayer
dollars are wasted on illegal payments.54 This magnifies defendants’ potential
reputational harm as compared to that in other fraud lawsuits, where, for
example, one corporation may allege fraud by another in an action not
48 See Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[Rule 9(b)] only requires
the identification of the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare an
adequate answer from the allegations.”).
49 United States ex rel. Costner v. United States, 317 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2003).
50 Id. (emphasis added).
51 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
52 For a more detailed description of the typical ways companies and individuals in the health
care sector defraud the government, see Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP, Health
Care Fraud and False Claims, FALSE CLAIMS ACT RESOURCE CTR., http://www.falseclaimsact.com/
common-types-of-fraud/health-care-fraud [https://perma.cc/LQ32-5LTN].
53 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2017).
54 As a jurisdictional matter, the FCA prohibits only claims that are submitted to the
government for payment such that taxpayer dollars are at stake. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1).
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implicating tax dollars vis-à-vis the government. Fraud on the government
naturally requires defendants to defend against both the lawsuit itself and
potential bad publicity. Because an FCA defendant stands to suffer from public
disfavor, heightened notice consistent with the intent of Rule 9(b) is necessary
so that the defendant can respond quickly and efficiently to the allegations.
B. Frivolous Suits and Access to the Courts
In light of the threat that an FCA qui tam suit may pose to a defendant,
frivolous suits aimed to force a settlement are a natural worry. The Rules
Committee addressed the fear of defamatory fraud allegations based in scant
facts in the very construction of Rule 9(b);55 given the clear intent of the rule,
access to full discovery without any meaningful analysis of the sufficiency of
a complaint is clearly undesirable. Defendants’ worries must be considered
alongside plaintiffs’ ability to access the remedial power of the court through
discovery.
In Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court balanced similar considerations
to those at play in the Rule 9(b) split.56 Plausibility pleading, as conceived in
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, serves as a middle ground between
possibility and probability.57 This pleading framework has negatively affected
plaintiffs as they now survive the motion to dismiss stage and move on to
discovery less often.58 However, the tension remains between “spar[ing]”
defendants from “costly and complex discovery” and dismissing potentially
meritorious suits before the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to
investigate.59 Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit has described (albeit, in adopting a
more lenient approach to pleading), “Rule 9(b)’s ultimate meaning is contextspecific,”60 and a complaint’s ability to satisfy the particularity requirement
may vary depending on the nature and complexity of the case.61 Making this
analysis even harder, facts that support a claim that is “plausible on its face”62
in one context may be wholly insufficient in another. Therefore, the frivolity
55 See United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002)
(expressing disfavor toward allegations of fraud based on spurious factual reasoning).
56 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2009) (examining the connection between the
potential invasiveness of discovery and the motion to dismiss inquiry); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007) (distinguishing between a claim’s overall plausibility and the
particularization of the complaint’s allegations).
57 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
58 See generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE. L.J. 2270 (2012).
59 Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can
Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 68 (2010).
60 United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 188 (5th Cir. 2009).
61 2 BOESE, supra note 27, § 5.04[B][1], at 5-57.
62 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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of a complaint, and thus the desirability of a complainant’s access to the court,
is difficult to predict in the abstract.
This difficulty naturally engenders fear that private citizens may take
advantage of publicly available information, including pleadings and briefs in
other cases, to string together complaints that are only facially plausible and
to force defendants with deep pockets to settle. However, strike suits are less
of a concern in FCA qui tam cases than in other contexts for a number of
procedural and practical reasons.
While the text of the FCA does not say so, it is widely accepted that qui
tam relators may not proceed pro se.63 Because the claim in an FCA suit
ultimately belongs to the United States, the relator is not the true party in
interest.64 Such “ownership” of the claim remains even if the government
declines to intervene in the suit.65 In this regard, the case does not “belong
to” the relator.66 She may not represent herself in a qui tam action because
the case is not truly her own,67 and she must first find a lawyer willing to
represent her. Because members of the qui tam bar and firms who represent
relators often specialize in whistleblower suits and have experience
identifying meritorious allegations, this creates a built-in screening process
for frivolous suits before a relator is able to file a complaint.
Further, the original source rule limits a relator’s ability to rely on public
information to construct a qui tam complaint that will survive a motion to
dismiss. The FCA provides that a whistleblower “who has knowledge that is
independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing” is an “‘original source.’”68 Once the original source
of information brings forth such information, the only remaining party that
may intervene is the United States.69 A circuit split exists as to whether a
second relator’s action is barred if the first relator failed to plead the same

63 See Whistleblowers Not Permitted to Litigate Cases Under False Claims Act Without Counsel,
BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C., http://www.bergermontague.com/practice-areas/whistleblowers,-quitam-false-claims-act/whistleblowers,-qui-tam-false-claims-act-legal-blog/whistleblowers-not-permittedto-litigate-cases-under-false-claims-act-without-counsel [https://perma.cc/78JU-L4P5] (providing an
overview of the law and policy considerations that support this rule).
64 United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2008).
65 See id. (discussing ownership of a claim without distinguishing among cases based on the
United States’ choice to intervene).
66 Id.
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (“[T]he parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally . . . .” (emphasis added)). But see Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000) (acknowledging that “[t]he FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting
a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim”).
68 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012).
69 Id. § 3730(b)(5).
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facts with enough particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b).70 As a practical matter,
once a relator is deemed to be an original source, all other suits based on the
same facts are barred. This rule shields the defendant from facing numerous
lawsuits based on the same publicly available information. The resolution of
the circuit split on the connection between the Rule 9(b) pleading standard
and the first-to-file bar will determine the degree of such potential
protection.71 Nonetheless, the original source rule supports the notion that
strike suits will not necessarily follow from using anything other than a strict
approach to pleading with particularity.
Similarly, the FCA’s statute of limitations indicates Congress’s intent to
discourage plaintiffs from sitting on their claims to maximize their potential
recovery.72 By linking the expiration of the limitations period to the time
when facts material to the claim should have been known to the government,73
the statute demands expediency in fraud recovery. The circuits are also split
as to whether the statute of limitations provision of § 3731 also applies to
relators.74 However, courts generally give effect to statutory goals in interpreting
the ambiguity of the statute of limitations language,75 indicating their
willingness to weed out claimants with frivolous purposes.
Finally, the government’s failure to intervene should not be indicative of
the sufficiency of the allegations at the motion to dismiss stage. Indeed, in
determining when to bring suit, the government considers numerous factors
that speak to the government’s enforcement priorities and not to the adequacy
of a specific complaint.76 For example, the government factors into its decision
70 Compare Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring a
relator to satisfy Rule 9(b) to be considered an original source), with United States ex rel. Batiste v.
SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (not requiring the initial relator to survive a Rule
9(b) challenge before imposing a bar on suits by other relators).
71 See Karin Lee, Note, Linking Rule 9(b) Pleading and the First-to-File Rule to Advance the Goals
of the False Claims Act, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (2014) (“[T]he more claims that are allowed to
survive 9(b), the bigger the pool of claims defendants can draw from to bar later-filed claims.”).
72 See United States ex rel. Sanders v. N. Am. Bus Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir.
2008) (finding that a reading of the statute of limitations in the FCA that incentivizes relators to sit
on their claims before filing to increase their own potential recovery is inconsistent with
congressional intent).
73 See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) (2012) (stating that an action may not be brought “more than 3
years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have
been known”).
74 For an in-depth analysis of the varying interpretations of the text of the FCA statute of
limitations, see generally Stephen S. Stallings & Lauren E. Caravello, Wait Not, Want Not: The
Importance of the Statute of Limitations in Qui Tam False Claims Act Cases, 7 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB.
HEALTH L. 245 (2013).
75 See, e.g., Sanders, 546 F.3d at 295-96 (finding that a majority of circuits hold that the FCA’s
statute of limitations is extended only in cases where the United States is a party).
76 See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016) (describing the governments’s enforcement activities). In
addition, one might look to certain government actions as indicators of the government’s position

1448

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 1435

the influence of an alleged fraudulent activity on health care access and
quality, patient autonomy, and clinical decisionmaking.77 Moreover, the
government’s failure to intervene could simply be a symptom of too many
suits and not enough resources. This is especially likely in the health care
sector, where fraud abounds.78
In sum, the peculiarities of health care fraud cases add color to the
traditional conflict between protecting defendants from frivolous suits and
giving plaintiffs sufficient access to court. In subsection III.B.1, I address how
the court should weigh such considerations when determining whether a case
warrants particularity discovery.
C. The Relator’s Informational Disparity
Congress’s choice to grant standing to private citizens in FCA matters
suggests that the proper approach to assessing the sufficiency of a complaint
may depend on the relator’s practical ability to plead with sufficient
particularity.79 When the government declines to intervene and qui tam
plaintiffs are left to their own investigatory resources, the informational
disparity they face warrants taking a critical look at the court’s dismissal
analysis under Rule 9(b). Indeed, the representative sample approach is
“[r]iddled with [e]xceptions”80 in health care fraud cases across the circuits,
suggesting that certain contexts and certain kinds of relators warrant special
consideration by the court.
For example, at least one court has granted a whistleblower leniency under
the representative sample approach when the relator was able to plead the
reasons why she believed the defendant submitted false claims.81 In United
States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Properties of Lake County, Inc., the relator was a
on a case or its merits, such as the time it took to make the decision not to intervene, or the subject
matter of its briefings to the court as a party in interest. However, it is unlikely that such indicators
are proxies that tell the whole story about how the government views a case.
77 Some experts refer to these considerations as “prudential factors.” Arnold & Porter LLP,
Connecting Through mHealth Solutions: Fraud & Abuse Implications for Patient, Physician, ACO,
Hospital and Industry Partner Engagement Models (June 10, 2015), http://files.arnoldporter.com/
ebookconnectingthroughmhealthsolutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMV2-255N].
78 At the close of the last fiscal year, the Department of Justice had over 1400 civil health care
fraud matters pending. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 53, at 71.
79 But see 2 BOESE, supra note 27, § 5.04[A][2] (“Although a few early cases allowed some
leniency in qui tam complaints, because the relator had no investigatory power, that exception has
been discredited.”); Smoter, supra note 45, at 255 (arguing that a relator’s insider status should not
affect the standard a court uses to assess the sufficiency of her complaint).
80 Fisher K. Law, Note, Proper Pleading or Premature Proof ? Rule 9(b)’s Particularity Requirement
and the False Claims Act, 49 GA. L. REV. 855, 871 (2015).
81 United States ex rel. Walker v. R&F Props. of Lake Cty., Inc., 433 F.3d 1349, 1360 (11th
Cir. 2005).
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nurse practitioner (NP) employed by the defendant family medical practice.82
The standard practice for billing federal payers for NP services involves one
of two alternatives: either the NP directly bills with a certification that her
services were “incident to the service of a physician,”83 or she bills through a
particular doctor.84 The former requires the NP to use her own Unique
Provider Identification Number (UPIN); the latter requires the use of the
physician’s UPIN and an implied certification that the services were
performed under that physician’s supervision.85 The complaint alleged that
the relator was never given her own UPIN number (thus eliminating her
ability to bill under the first alternative), and that, each day, she received
instructions as to which doctor’s UPIN to use for billing, even if she was not
actually being supervised by that doctor.86 She also alleged that billing within
the practice had never occurred in any other manner.87 Even without a literal
representative “sample,” the court found the complaint to be sufficient
because the relator was able to plead beyond mere speculation of fraudulent
activity based on her experience within the practice.88
Even the Sixth Circuit, which has yet to relax the stringent representative
sample approach, has left open the possibility that knowledge akin to the
relator’s in Walker could provide the basis for an adequate pleading. In
Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., the relators were two doctor-owners of a radiology
services business that contracted with the defendant, VPA, to interpret
radiological images.89 Based on their difficulty reading the defendant’s scans,
the relators concluded and alleged that VPA must have billed the government
for tests performed with improper equipment, by personnel with inadequate
training, or for clinical indications that were not properly documented.90
Despite such detailed information and medical expertise, including references
to specific scans, the court affirmed the dismissal of the relators’ claim because
it failed to satisfy Rule 9(b).91 The relators’ personal knowledge was an
important consideration for the court but insufficient in this case: their
knowledge related to a general scheme, not to billing procedures or the nature
of VPA’s government contracts.92 The latter kind of personal knowledge, the

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 1353.
42 C.F.R. § 410.26(b) (2015).
Walker, 433 F.3d at 1352-53.
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
655 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 465.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 471.
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court said, would likely be persuasive to dispense with the representative
sample approach in that case.93
Finally, in the Eighth Circuit, at least one set of facts led the court to use
the strong inference approach even though it would otherwise demand a
representative sample of fraudulent claims. In United States ex rel. Thayer v.
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, an insider relator was able to plead
sufficient details of an alleged fraudulent scheme by Planned Parenthood to
file false claims for certain birth control and abortion services:
Thayer adequately alleges the particular details of these schemes, such as the
names of the individuals that instructed her to carry out these schemes, the
two-year time period in which these schemes took place, the clinics that
participated in these schemes, and the methods by which these schemes were
perpetrated. Moreover, she alleges that her position as center manager gave
her access to Planned Parenthood’s centralized billing system, pleads specific
details about Planned Parenthood’s billing systems and practices, and alleges
that she had personal knowledge of Planned Parenthood’s submission of false
claims.94

Such details sufficed for these allegations to survive the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.95 The Thayer decision supports the notion that while
relators necessarily operate with an informational disadvantage as plaintiffs,
courts can be convinced of the credibility of a relator’s knowledge of
fraudulent claims when her information on a defendant’s practices reaches
some threshold level of specificity.
These cases illustrate that even relators in the health care fraud context
who are sophisticated whistleblowers with a great deal of valuable inside
information may not always have the right information for the purpose of
satisfying Rule 9(b). As I argue below, such knowledge can more optimally
be used to evaluate a motion for particularity discovery than to rule on a
motion to dismiss.
D. Goals of the False Claims Act
The Department of Justice and Department of Health & Human Services
have repeatedly indicated that health care fraud enforcement is a high
priority. As discussed above, the staggeringly high annual recovery amounts
per year make this an area ripe for protecting taxpayer dollars and the
integrity of government-funded programs.96 Further, Congress’s intent to
93
94
95
96

Id.
765 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id.
See supra Section I.A.
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prosecute disloyalty and dishonesty to the United States is clear from the
legislative history of the FCA.97
Beyond these original goals, the FCA has become an important
mechanism for policing activities in the clinical context that can be harmful
to patients. Indeed, the federal government has undertaken the role of
protecting the public’s health since at least the mid-1800s.98 Through the FCA
and other statutes and regulations,99 the government directly and indirectly
evaluates the safety and efficacy of drugs and medical procedures that are
available for consumers. Notably, lawmakers were attuned to the importance
of policing fraud in the health care sector as far back as the passage of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which created the foundation
of the modern regulatory framework for pharmaceuticals.100 Senators carefully
calculated the implications of requiring scientific data to back up claims of a
drug’s effectiveness; after significant debate, they decided that in the absence
of such scientific foundation, a claim of effectiveness should be considered
fraudulent.101 The FCA’s current use as an additional mechanism to impose
liability for health care fraud is therefore consistent with congressional intent
to police fraud in the health care space.
A strict, unwavering particularity pleading standard prevents potentially
meritorious allegations from proceeding to discovery, which interferes with
the goals of policing both fraud against the government and fraud that results
in unsafe or ineffective practices.102 Especially when defendants are promoting
potentially dangerous uses for drugs or medical devices, FCA relators play an
important role in bringing those defendants to court for recovery. The
seriousness of a false claim, particularly as characterized by its relation to
unsafe medical practices, should be an important consideration for courts in

97
98

See supra text accompanying notes 7–9, 12.
See About FDA: History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/History [https://perma.cc/66C6-2KXC] (describing the origins of the Food & Drug
Administration).
99 For both civil and criminal offenses, these include the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938, the Anti-Kickback Statute, and the Stark Law, along with their related regulations.
100 See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
101 See 81 CONG. REC. 2004 (1937) (statements of Sens. Robinson & Copeland) (discussing
the practical effects of imposing fraud liability for lack of scientific evidence).
102 See, e.g., Brief for United States—Takeda, supra note 29, at 14-15 (stating that a strict,
unwavering application of the representative sample approach would prevent whistleblowers from
assisting the government in policing fraud in the health care sector as Congress intended them to
do); Emily T. Chen, Note, Depressing Diagnosis: Stringent Particularity Requirement of the Rule 9(b)
Pleading Standard as a Critical Bar to Off-Label Promotion Fraud Whistleblowers, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
333, 365 (2014) (“The heightened pleading standard, then, would bar many nonfrivolous qui tam
lawsuits at the very start and would thus undermine congressional intent . . . .”).
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evaluating the sufficiency of an FCA complaint, and that analysis that can be
inserted into a decision on particularity discovery, as I outline in Part III.
E. Summary
Courts’ willingness to permit exceptions to the representative sample
standard, relators’ informational inequities, and the goals of the FCA point
in favor of an approach more lenient than the strict representative sample
approach. However, because Rule 9(b)’s requirements are firmly rooted in
defendant protection—a particularly compelling goal in FCA cases—this new
approach should require more than the strong inference standard. Indeed,
successfully alleging a false claim requires a high degree of specificity, and
relaxing the standard detracts from the important balance that the Rules
Committee and the Supreme Court have already addressed in the
construction of Rule 9(b) and the Twombly–Iqbal framework.
An optimal resolution of the circuit split involves reframing the dismissal
stage to address the unique circumstances of typical health care fraud relators
and to give them a chance to meet a strict pleading standard. In Part III, I
argue that particularity discovery provides a solution that addresses the
procedural, substantive, and policy arguments on both sides of the debate.
III. PROPOSAL: PARTICULARITY DISCOVERY
Particularity discovery combined with the strict representative sample
standard would provide a workable and optimal balance between the two
existing approaches to pleading and would align with the practical realities of
whistleblower suits. As described in Part II, the distinctive features of health
care fraud qui tam suits suggest a need for a critical eye toward existing FCA
pleading practices.
Pre-merits discovery for the purpose of surviving a motion to dismiss is not
a novel concept. Following the decision in Iqbal, at least one scholar has explored
using such discovery to assist plaintiffs in satisfying the plausibility pleading
standard.103 This Comment proposes an extension of the use of pre-merits
discovery to allow relators to satisfy the particularity requirement in health
care fraud cases.

103 See Malveaux, supra note 59, at 108 (“Courts should consider narrow, targeted plausibility
discovery at the pleadings stage to insure that the trans-substantive application of the Rules does
not work an injustice against those cases involving informational inequities.”). But see Bratton v.
Town of Fortville, No. 1:09-cv-1391-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 2291853, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. June 2, 2010)
(“The Supreme Court has clearly rejected the availability of [plausibility discovery] . . . where the
plaintiff ’s allegations simply fail to state a plausible claim.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007))).
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Courts already have the authority to permit pre-merits discovery and
indeed do so in other contexts, including class certification and threshold
jurisdictional questions.104 The use of particularity discovery in health care
fraud whistleblower cases would be consistent with the government’s position
that Rule 9(b) should not be an insurmountable barrier to relators’ role in
fraud enforcement. In fact, it would likely further current enforcement goals.
Limiting and targeting the scope of pre-merits discovery would provide
defendants with notice and reputational protection while resolving the problem
of relators’ distinct type of informational inequity. Finally, incorporating
particularity discovery in accordance with this framework would optimize the
selection of cases proceeding to full-fledged discovery. Plaintiffs would still be
required to meet the representative sample particularity standard to survive a
motion to dismiss, but the court’s analysis would be structured to grant
relators an opportunity to satisfy that standard in an amended complaint.
A. Pre-Merits Discovery in Other Contexts
In this Section, I will outline the use of pre-merits discovery in class
certification and jurisdictional disputes. My goal here is to extrapolate
principles from these contexts that can inform the proposal that I outline in
Section III.B. I weave these principles into the mechanics of particularity
discovery below.
1. Class Certification Discovery
In class action lawsuits, the court may use pre-merits discovery to
determine whether the four prerequisites for certifying a class of Rule 23(a)
are met and whether the proposed class falls within one of the enumerated
categories of Rule 23(b).105 The plaintiff bears the burden not just of pleading
the prerequisites at this pretrial phase, but also of proving them.106 Generally,
104 For a discussion of the court’s discretion to permit discovery prior to ruling on a 12(b)(6)
motion, see Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010),
and subsection III.B.2.
105 See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (restating the requirement that
the court must undergo a rigorous analysis before certifying a class). The four elements required by
Rule 23(a) are numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a). Rule 23(b) requires the court to assess whether (1) prosecuting separate actions would result
in incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would substantially impede other individuals
from protecting their interests; (2) injunctive relief or declaratory relief would be appropriate given
that the defendant has acted or refused to act in a way that applies generally to the entire class; or
(3) that common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting individual
members. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). A court must determine whether the plaintiff has proven all four
elements of Rule 23(a) and that one category in Rule 23(b) applies to the proposed class action.
106 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014).
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pre-certification discovery is necessary when the parties dispute any facts
related to any of the prerequisites.107 In 2003, the Rules Committee revised
Rule 23 to require that certification occur at “an early practicable time,”108
suggesting its desire to permit more discovery when making the certification
determination.109
Pre-merits discovery requires that a plaintiff first make a prima facie
showing that discovery is likely to show that the prerequisites for class
certification are met.110 The court then undertakes a difficult balance when
determining the extent to which it will permit pre-certification discovery.
Indeed, the court must answer questions of access and resources similar to
the concerns it faces when deciding a motion to dismiss in a qui tam suit. A
plaintiff typically succeeds on her discovery motion when information that
would later be discoverable within the scope of Rule 26 is relevant to the
question of certification and the defendant has exclusive control over that
information.111 Similarly, a whistleblower will likely know which information
she needs from the defendant, even though she does not have access to it.
At present, the court may consider the merits of the case during precertification discovery only to the extent that they relate to the question of
certification.112 Particularly when determining commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation, it would seem nearly impossible to disregard the
merits inquiry altogether. Although the posture will differ, the court must
consider the same questions of law and fact during the certification process
as in any proceeding involving the merits.
While admittedly “[t]he class certification determination is more about
the scope and structure of the lawsuit than its very existence,”113 it is
instructive that the rules permit pre-certification discovery despite difficulties
in bifurcating the merits determination. In class action pre-certification
discovery motions, the court must determine whether the complaint on its
face alleges a case that satisfies Rule 23(a). Similarly, in Rule 9(b) decisions,
the court must decide whether the relator has sufficiently pled the particulars
of an FCA violation that is plausible on its face without delving too far into
the details of the alleged fraudulent activity. A plaintiff ’s motion for
107 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.14 (2004) (discussing when
discovery may be necessary in this context).
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.
110 See, e.g., Perez v. Safelite Grp. Inc., 553 Fed. App’x 667, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that discovery will substantiate the Rule 23(a) elements).
111 See 8 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 24.80, at
309-10 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that in the context of employment discrimination class actions, the
informational inequity between the parties is a relevant consideration for the court).
112 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013).
113 Malveaux, supra note 59, at 112.
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particularity discovery would require her to allege that a fraudulent scheme
exists and that targeted, pre-merits discovery would provide a representative
sample of false claims.
2. Jurisdictional Discovery
Neither in personam nor subject matter jurisdiction discovery provide exact
guides for structuring particularity discovery because they are inherently
substantive inquiries; only a facial challenge to jurisdiction would be precisely
analogous to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.114 As Malveaux theorizes, however,
certain discrete aspects of jurisdictional discovery are potentially illustrative
on this topic.115
Complex issues in litigation do not lend themselves to universal, catchall
understandings of procedure. The court’s inquiry regarding jurisdictional
discovery must begin with “clearly understand[ing] the plaintiff’s jurisdictional
claim.”116 Similarly, where a relator seeks discovery under the proposed scheme,
the court must first understand the sufficiency of the original complaint; the
relator’s identity, knowledge of the defendant’s operations, and potential
information inequity; and the degree to which a plaintiff can narrowly identify
the minimum information necessary to allege a representative sample of false
claims. To determine the latter, the court may even consider the potential
effectiveness of ordering a meet-and-confer conference.117
Further, as with class certification, the court has discretion to consider
whether the plaintiff has met her initial burden prior to her jurisdictional
discovery motion. The plaintiff must first make a colorable case for
jurisdiction; otherwise, the court may have no basis to believe that any
amount of discovery will establish jurisdiction over the claim.118 Similarly, in
this Comment’s proposed Rule 9(b) particularity discovery analysis, the
relator must first allege a colorable claim for an FCA violation by pleading
enough details of the alleged fraudulent activity that make it plausible that
the defendant submitted at least one false claim. If the plaintiff fails to meet

114 Id. at 119-20.
115 See id. at 117-22 (analogizing jurisdictional discovery to other forms of pre-merits discovery).
116 Steven R. Swanson, Jurisdictional Discovery Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445, 482 (1999).
117 See Malveaux, supra note 59, at 120 (“To facilitate [jurisdictional] discovery, a court may

order the parties to meet, confer, and formulate a discovery plan.”). Concededly, the fundamental
difference between a substantive jurisdictional inquiry and a facial challenge to the plausibility of
the complaint will likely affect a defendant’s willingness to cooperate in such a conference.
Nonetheless, the authority to order the parties to meet and confer may prove useful in certain cases.
118 See, e.g., Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. L’Union Atlantique S.A. d’Assurances, 723
F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1983) (directing the district court to allow discovery on jurisdiction where the
plaintiff ’s claim is “not clearly frivolous”).
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this burden, the district court would have the discretion to deny pre-merits
discovery, just as it would have discretion to deny jurisdictional discovery.119
Because a motion for particularity discovery would not be granted as a matter
of course to whistleblowers, this proposal ensures that the court will not be
flooded with qui tam fishing expeditions.
Finally, the proposed particularity discovery can be limited in scope, not
unlike jurisdictional discovery. Courts generally will deny vague requests for
jurisdictional discovery,120 but the precise boundaries of the appropriate inquiry
are unknown.121 That the definition of “limited” jurisdictional discovery has
not been identified does not foreclose the court’s ability to assess the scope of
pre-merits discovery on a case-by-case basis. One possibility, proposed by
Strong, is that the scope of pre-merits discovery remain limited compared to
the broader scope of merits discovery.122 In other words, the discovery sought
must be relevant to the disposition of the particular inquiry at hand—in the
context of jurisdiction, the 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(2) motion, or in the context of a
whistleblower’s request for particularity discovery, the 12(b)(6) motion. As
described above, the court may limit discovery in kind or degree depending
on the particular case at hand and the relevant facts necessary for the plaintiff
to meet her burden.123 Again, the court must tailor the scope of discovery
granted to its understanding of the pleadings.
B. Mechanics of the Proposal
In this Section, I propose a procedure for incorporating particularity
discovery into the motion to dismiss stage of health care fraud qui tam lawsuits
in which the government declines to intervene. Bearing in mind the concerns
raised by proponents of both existing approaches and the examples provided
by pre-certification and jurisdictional discovery, I propose this procedure and
analysis of a motion for particularity discovery as a middle ground.
Once the court lifts the seal from an FCA complaint, the defendant
generally moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In
119 See id. (emphasizing that in this context the court has discretion over whether to permit
discovery to proceed).
120 See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 341-42 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that a party
“may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but
unspecified, facts” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co.,
612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980))).
121 See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 489, 532 (2010) (noting that “there is no real understanding of what [scope of discovery] is
appropriate in any particular set of circumstances”).
122 Id. at 532-33.
123 See id. at 536-57 (outlining the types of facts that may be relevant for determining legislative
or constitutional authority for jurisdiction).
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recognition of her need to identify specific examples of fraudulent claims to
satisfy the “representative sample” approach and avoid dismissal, the plaintiff
may seek specific facts or information from the defendant. It is unlikely that
the defendant will be willing to turn over such information at this stage in
the litigation without a court order, and she may even move to stay discovery.
At this point, the plaintiff will make a motion for particularity discovery
under Rule 7(b).124 The burden will be on the plaintiff to demonstrate
relevant facts and circumstances, outlined below, that warrant particularity
discovery. This is not inconsistent with Rule 26, which states that “[p]arties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”125 The
motion should explain the basis for the request by pointing to specific
information in the complaint.
This is the point of divergence from the court’s standard motion to
dismiss inquiry. In the plaintiff ’s brief on behalf of himself and the United
States in Foglia, the relator argued that “Rule 9(b) may be satisfied by
pleading fraud on information and belief, if the pleader identifies the available
information on which the allegation of fraud is founded.”126 Alternatively, under
the representative sample approach, the court looks to see if the plaintiff has
identified at least one claim by time, place, content, and names of actors.
Regardless of the complaint’s sufficiency under either existing approach, the
court at this point has enough information to decide on the motion for
particularity discovery, and should do so rather than immediately rule on the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.
To satisfy her initial burden under this proposed framework, the plaintiff
must first plead sufficiently detailed allegations of a fraudulent scheme that
suggest it is plausible that the defendant submitted a false claim. In other
words, a claim that does not satisfy the Twombly–Iqbal pleading standard will
not suffice,127 but the plaintiff need not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s representative
sample standard in the initial complaint as a condition for particularity
discovery. Rather, the court will consider the allegations in the initial complaint
combined with other factors, discussed here, to make its ruling. These factors
are consistent with the proportionality requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) because

124
125

See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b) (requiring that a motion state the relief sought).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26 was revised in 2015, and the scope of permissible discovery
now includes a proportionality requirement.
126 Brief with Joint Appendix 1-23 Volume I on Behalf of Appellant at 18, Foglia ex rel. United
States v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, No. 12-4050 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2013) (emphasis added).
127 See Hartnett, supra note 104, at 511 (noting Iqbal’s determination that a complaint’s lack of
plausibility precludes even cabined pre-merits discovery).
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they help the court determine the appropriate scope of discovery based on
the facts and circumstances of the case and the pre-merits posture.128
If the court grants particularity discovery, discovery should proceed
according to an order limiting its scope. The plaintiff may employ any typical
discovery mechanisms, including interrogatories, depositions or document
requests, within the boundaries outlined in the discovery order.
After discovery, the plaintiff may seek leave to amend her complaint under
Rule 15,129 and the court is likely to grant this request to the extent that the
proposed amendments seek to remedy the deficiencies identified in the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. Assuming the plaintiff is able to identify a
false claim through discovery, the relator should have everything she needs to
satisfy a strict reading of Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.130 The court
should then evaluate the sufficiency of the amended complaint under the
representative sample approach.
1. Ruling on the Particularity Discovery Motion
Relevant considerations for the court when deciding on the particularity
discovery motion include the identity and characteristics of the relator(s); the
characteristics of the case and the degree of sufficiency of the initial complaint;
and the seriousness of the allegations. Scholars have proposed that courts use
similar factors to address motions to stay discovery when a motion to dismiss
is pending.131 I address each of these considerations in turn.
a. Relators
Rule 9(b) applies to qui tam relators despite information inequities.132 In
fact, John T. Boese contends that because of relators’ intimate knowledge of
the defendant’s practices, the court should demand more of them than the
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (directing the court to determine the scope of discovery based on
“the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).
129 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”).
130 The plaintiff still bears the burden of pleading an FCA violation that is plausible on its
face, in accordance with Twombly and Iqbal. While particularity discovery may also allow the plaintiff
to satisfy that requirement, it does not follow that finding a “sample” to plead through pre-merits
discovery will automatically save the complaint from dismissal. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nathan
v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir. 2013) (dismissing for lack of plausibility
even though the plaintiff pled a representative sample).
131 See Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to Stay Discovery
When a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 90-91 (2012) (outlining eight
considerations that echo the Rule 26(b)(1) factors for the court to weigh when ruling on a pre-merits
discovery motion).
132 2 BOESE, supra note 27, § 5.04[B][1].
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average plaintiff, instead of granting them leniency.133 Indeed, modern
relators are often compliance officers, managers, doctors, nurses, or in-house
counsel who have a high level of access and understanding of the defendant’s
conduct in the health care space.134
However, to hold that all qui tam relators should conduct their cases
within the same rigid framework ignores the modern reality of fraud in the
health care sector. In small qui tam actions, the relator could potentially be a
low-level employee who has credible knowledge of a fraudulent scheme but
limited access to concrete data to support it.135 For example, in United States
ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., the court determined that the relator
could not fairly allege that proof of fraud was solely in the possession of the
defendant when the relator had been employed there for twenty years.136 On
these grounds, the court found that the relator failed to satisfy Rule 9(b), and
his complaint was dismissed.137 But, the Lee court’s disposition rests on a false
premise regarding the sophistication of a relator; a relator’s insider status
should warrant a demand for her to know how and where to find information
within the defendant’s control, not to actually have that information.
Despite the relator’s inside knowledge, the high level of complexity of
health care billing and claims management renders it unwise for us to hold
every plaintiff to a strict pleading standard without assessing her individual
characteristics. To meet her burden of showing “good cause” for particularity
discovery, the relator must be able to identify what she is looking for and
where she believes she will find it. When evaluating the whistleblower’s
motion, the court should avoid a premature merits inquiry by assessing the
relator’s degree of familiarity with the defendant’s business practices in
conjunction with her ability to articulate how she will target her discovery
efforts. The court should anticipate this degree of sophistication to be reflected
in the detail provided in the initial complaint, which I will turn to next.

133
134

Id.
See Kathleen M. Boozang, Comment, The New Relators: In-House Counsel and Compliance
Officers, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 16, 18 (2012) (discussing an increase in licensed attorneys
bringing cases as FCA relators in recent years).
135 See, e.g., Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Cashi v. Fox Hollow Techs. Inc., No.
1:09-cv-01066-WMS (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2010).
136 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).
137 The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the district court should have granted Lee leave
to amend his complaint because it could be construed to allege a claim based on worthless services
fraudulently provided to the government. Id. at 1053.
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b. Characteristics of the Case and the Sufficiency of the Initial Complaint
The cases outlined in Parts I and II illustrate the method the court should
use to assess the allegations in a complaint facing a motion to dismiss. I
consider each of them in turn.
Cases in which the discovery inquiry can be limited to a single, discrete
fact are strong candidates for particularity discovery. For example, in Foglia,
information as to whether Renal was charging the government as if it were
using vials of Zemplar in a certain way was not in the relator’s control; this
information alone would have plainly shown either the existence or absence
of false claims.138 In the event that Renal was using vials of Zemplar properly,
the court’s resources and the defendant’s reputation would have been spared
in favor of other enforcement actions with greater merit. In Walker, the court
made an exception to its ordinarily stringent requirement because the NP
relator’s pleading was sufficient to illustrate why she believed the defendant
had committed fraud.139 Alternatively, her detailed knowledge would have
lent itself well to a discovery inquiry. For example, she could have requested
specific billing records for particular days she believed the defendant was
billing the government fraudulently.
Chesbrough would have been a closer call, but ultimately would also have
been a case ripe for particularity discovery.140 There, the relators had detailed
knowledge of radiology scans and standards for equipment and personnel,
but, as independent contractors rather than employees, they did not have the
same intimate familiarity with the defendant’s billing practices as did the
Walker relator.141 While the complaint may have contained sufficient detail to
grant a motion for particularity discovery, the relators may not have had the
sophistication to find what they needed to generate a representative sample.
The court may likely have ended up granting a motion to dismiss for failure to
plead with particularity in the amended complaint. Even though the ultimate
disposition of the case would have been the same, the decision to dismiss would
have been more informed with the addition of particularity discovery.
In some cases, the discovery inquiry might rest entirely on the detail
provided in the complaint. Recall that in Thayer, the court found the relator’s
knowledge of the defendant’s billing practices and fraudulent scheme to be so
specific that it, in effect, waived the requirement of a representative sample
because the “strong inference” was so compelling.142 As a policy matter, this
relator had a strong case for access to the courts—it is desirable for such
138
139
140
141
142

See supra text accompanying notes 40–43.
See supra text accompanying notes 81–88.
See supra text accompanying notes 89–93.
See supra text accompanying notes 89–93.
See supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
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detailed allegations to proceed to full discovery. Particularity discovery
nonetheless plays a role in the pre-merits phase to help identify the particular
claims at issue, thereby placing the defendant on proper notice. Rather than
simply denying the motion to dismiss outright, the court may, at its discretion,
permit targeted particularity discovery to further these goals and assess the
“correctness” of its inclination to deny the motion.
Finally, the use of discovery to resolve a complaint’s deficiency under Rule
9(b) should be distinguished from its use to cure a Twombly–Iqbal plausibility
problem. In Takeda, for example, the relator’s pleading contained one key
deficiency preventing the case from surviving the motion to dismiss: whether
the sixteen doctors in question in fact prescribed Kapidex at sixty-milligram
doses.143 In its brief, however, the United States took the position that the
Takeda case was an inappropriate vehicle for addressing the Rule 9(b) circuit
split because the complaint failed for lack of plausibility under the Twombly–
Iqbal framework despite a representative sample of names and false claims.144
Although the court could have sufficiently cabined the inquiry to give the
plaintiff a chance to identify at least one prescription by one of the identified
doctors at the off-label dose (assuming it existed), the plausibility problem is
distinct from a sample deficiency. Thus, Takeda would not necessarily have
been a case ripe for particularity discovery under the proposed framework.
c. Seriousness of the Allegations
The government’s position on the proper interpretation of Rule 9(b) is not
inconsistent with allowing particularity discovery during the pre-dismissal
stage. In the Solicitor General’s amicus brief in Takeda, the United States
noted the numerous exceptions to the representative sample approach, some
of which are described in Section II.C, and advocated for a more relaxed
pleading standard to support the policy goals of the FCA.145 In recognizing
the informational inequity of relators, the Solicitor General articulated,
Subjecting qui tam relators to a per se rule requiring the identification of
specific false claims is especially unwarranted because it attaches dispositive
significance to the relator’s awareness of details that in most instances are
already known to the government. . . . Requiring qui tam complaints to
identify specific false claims thus would not meaningfully assist the
government’s enforcement efforts. To the contrary, the likely effect of such a
requirement would be to discourage the filing of qui tam suits by relators . . .

143
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United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 458-59 (4th Cir. 2013).
Brief for United States—Takeda, supra note 29, at 10-11.
Id. at 11-12.
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who would otherwise have the means and the incentive to expose frauds
against the United States.146

The government does not misstate the tension between relators’ inability
to plead certain facts with specificity and the potential harm that fewer qui
tam actions would provide. However, the government ignores the possible
role of pre-merits discovery, which might further its goals while still requiring
plaintiffs to plead specific false claims.
The proposed framework for particularity discovery allows the court to
use its discretion to give effect to this tension and the goals of the government
in FCA enforcement. The more serious the alleged violation, the more willing
the court should be to grant pre-merits discovery to allow the relator an
opportunity to “meaningfully assist the government’s enforcement efforts.”147
Particularity discovery does not simply subject relators to a per se rule
requiring them to identify false claims; it also gives them an adequate
opportunity to meet that burden with the assistance of a court order.
2. Authority and Discretion of the District Court to Order
Pre-Merits Discovery
The discretion to oversee discovery, including to order or deny pre-merits
discovery, lies within the existing authority of the district court.148 Indeed,
the procedure described here mirrors what could theoretically already occur
in a court that has adopted the representative sample approach; except in
certain cases,149 discovery is not automatically stayed pending a motion to
dismiss.150 In a court demanding a representative sample of false claims to
satisfy Rule 9(b), the judge maintains discretion to order discovery prior to
the disposition of the 12(b)(6) motion and will not routinely order a stay.151
This proposal thus leaves much discretion in the hands of the judge, and there
are a number of possible procedural outcomes: a denial of particularity
discovery followed by the grant of a motion to dismiss; a denial of particularity
146
147
148

Id. at 16.
Id.
See Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 21 (2d Cir. 2003) (reviewing for abuse
of discretion the district court’s decision to deny class certification without allowing discovery of
factual information necessary to that decision).
149 See, e.g., In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 0695 (SWK), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49162 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006) (ruling on a motion to lift the automatic stay of discovery
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
150 See SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 852 F.2d 936, 945 n.11 (7th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the mere filing of a motion to dismiss does not automatically preclude discovery
pending a ruling on the motion).
151 See Hartnett, supra note 104, at 507-08 (stating that it is “not routine” for a district court to
order a stay in this context).
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discovery followed by denial of a motion to dismiss; a grant of particularity
discovery and a subsequent grant of a motion to dismiss; and a grant of
particularity discovery and a subsequent denial of a motion to dismiss.152
This proposal does not cabin the discretion of the district court to stay or
otherwise deny pre-merits discovery.153 This is because it does not require that
courts grant pre-merits discovery in certain circumstances, but rather
encourages courts to adopt a more rigid standard for assessing the particularity
of a complaint in recognition of the likely appropriateness of targeted
discovery to identify a sample of false claims. Relators’ counsel must thus
remain diligent and mindful of the court’s ultimate discretion to decide
against them on a pre-merits discovery motion. The decision to grant or deny
discovery is reviewable for abuse of discretion,154 whereas a 12(b)(6) ruling is
reviewable de novo.155 The proposed framework in essence conflates the two
decisions, giving the ruling on a motion for pre-merits discovery the weight
of a ruling on a motion to dismiss. As such, a pre-merits discovery motion
denial that effectively becomes dispositive (by precluding a plaintiff ’s ability
to plead a representative sample) would seem to increase the discretion
available to the district court judge. This proposal merely suggests to the
court a framework for understanding a particularity discovery motion; short
of the incorporation of particularity discovery through binding jurisprudence
or an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this structure
provides no additional protection on appeal for relators operating under the
representative sample standard.
3. Final Considerations
The proposal for particularity discovery gives effect to the pros and cons of
both existing approaches while considering the peculiarities of whistleblowers
in the health care context, the oddities of health care fraud fact patterns, and
the role of the government’s enforcement goals in helping cases to proceed.
Judicial rulings on motions to compel and other ordinary discovery disputes
in qui tam cases illustrate the capacity of courts to craft limited, targeted
discovery plans. In Dalitz v. AmSurg Corp., the defendant, a treatment facility,
failed to perform certain reimbursement requirements prior to performing
surgical procedures, and then submitted claims for those surgeries to state
152
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See id. at 509-10 (discussing these permutations).
For a proposal on how the court should exercise this discretion that echoes the factors
outlined here, see generally Lynch, supra note 131.
154 See Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 414 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We
review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion.”).
155 See United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim . . . .”).
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and federal payers.156 Viewing the allegations through the lens of the amended
Rule 26(b)(1), the district court cabined discovery geographically, but widened
its scope temporally in recognition of the size and scope of the billing volume
of the defendant corporation.157
Further, courts continue to indicate that the ability to consider more
information at the pleading stage is preferable. In Cardiac Devices, the court
found that where the plaintiffs served patient and procedure lists on the
defendants separately from the complaint, the purpose of Rule 9(b) had been
satisfied.158 While in that case the purpose of the separate documents was to
protect patient privacy, the court’s message is clear: certain health care fraud
actions warrant distinctive considerations in the context of Rule 9(b).
Particularity discovery is one attractive avenue for addressing these kinds of
peculiarities.
CONCLUSION
Courts and scholars should be open to the idea of modified discovery
practices in health care fraud litigation. Both a more relaxed approach—the
strong inference standard—and a stricter approach—the representative
sample standard—to the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement have pros and
cons, but neither adequately addresses the uniqueness of qui tam FCA
lawsuits. Provided that judges can be persuaded that the peculiarities of fraud
in the health care sector warrant an alternative framework for decisionmaking
during the pre-trial phase, particularity discovery designed to help a qui tam
plaintiff satisfy a stricter reading of Rule 9(b) is a feasible middle ground to
resolve the circuit split. Because it captures the benefits of both the strict and
lenient standards to address the unique factual features of a typical health
care fraud qui tam case, it provides a better result than either standard alone.
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No. 2:12-cv-2218-TLN-CKD, 2015 WL 8717398, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015).
Id. at *3-4.
In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318, 338 (D. Conn. 2004).

